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Summary. This paper analyzes devaluations in a fixed exchange rate system by
endogenizing both the speculation and devaluation decisions. It is shown that
deterministic devaluation rules are generally sub-optimal for the central bank. In
order to deter speculation the central bank introduces uncertainty into the timing
of devaluation. The nature this mixed strategy is derived, as is the optimal strategy
for speculators. The analysis allows an explanation of successful devaluations that
are not precipitated by a speculative attacks, even under perfect capital mobility.
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1 Introduction
A recurring problem with fixed exchange rate regimes is the need to periodically
alter the exchange rate peg. This is a difficult problem for central banks because
speculators will attempt to predict and exploit devaluations through their foreign
currency purchases, creating the potential for an orderly devaluation to become a
full-fledged exchange rate crisis. Moreover, foreign currency sold to speculators
will either be lost or will have to be repurchased at the devalued exchange rate.
In either case there is a strong incentive for the central bank to try to avoid a
devaluation during a speculative attack by devaluing before the attack or, if it
has sufficient reserves, riding out the attack and devaluing later.
? This paper is adapted from the third chapter of my Georgetown University Ph.D. dissertation.
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This paper analyzes this issue by endogenizing both the speculation and
devaluation decisions. I show that deterministic devaluation rules are generally
sub-optimal for the central bank. In order to deter speculation the central bank
introduces uncertainty into the timing of devaluation. The nature this mixed
strategy is derived, as is the optimal strategy for speculators.
The literature has extensively analyzed abandonments of fixed exchange rate
systems. However, realignments in the fixed exchange rate regime have received
relatively little analysis. In fact, realignments are more often observed than aban-
donments. For example, in their extensive study Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz
find 101 devaluation or revaluations in the period 1959–93, as compared to 33
cases of fixed exchange rate abandonment.
Previous theoretical work examines realignments by analyzing only one side
of the market. Either central bank behavior is taken as exogenous and the optimal
speculator behavior is analyzed, or speculator behavior is taken as exogenous and
optimal central bank behavior is analyzed. To my knowledge, this is the first paper
that analyzes exchange rate realignments which endogenizes both central bank
and speculator behavior.
Blanco and Garber (1986) started the line of research that analyzes realign-
ments by studying speculator behavior, taking central bank strategies as exoge-
nous. They extended the seminal work of Krugman (1979) and Salant and Hen-
derson (1978) to incorporate devaluations rather than just fixed exchange rate
abandonments.1 Flood and Marion (1997a) take speculator behavior as exoge-
nous and analyze the central bank’s problem.2 They show that in the absence
of speculation the central bank’s optimal realignment policy in an inflationary
environment is given by an (S, s). The central bank fixes the nominal exchange
rate and offers to buy and sell foreign currency at that rate. As time goes by,
however, the fixed exchange rate leads to a real appreciation. Eventually, the real
exchange rate appreciates to s, and the central bank devalues to the real exchange
rate S, paying an adjustment cost to do so. The central bank then allows the real
exchange rate to be eroded by inflation and then devalues again.3 As the authors
point out, such investigations are only applicable to countries that are enforcing
perfect capital controls.
In the absence of perfect capital controls speculators will naturally attempt
to predict the timing of the devaluation and purchase foreign currency prior to
it. Thus, the optimum strategy for speculators depends on the behavior of the
central bank. Likewise, the optimum strategy for the central bank depends on the
behavior of speculators. The central bank has an incentive to avoid speculative
attacks. Rather than simply choosing a critical level of fundamentals at which
to devalue the exchange rate and accepting a speculative attack, the monetary
1 Surveys of the speculative attack literature are given by Agénor, Bhandari, and Flood (1992),
Blackburn and Sola (1993), and Flood and Marion (1997b).
2 This approach is adapted from Sheshinski and Weiss (1977) where they show that optimal
monopoly pricing in inflationary environments is given by an (S, s) rule.
3 See also Collins (1995) which takes a similar approach to inquire into what central banks are
actually targeting.
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authority has an incentive to try to preempt an expected attack by devaluing
before it occurs. Of course speculators will try to predict this preemptive devalu-
ation and exploit it through their foreign currency purchases. In equilibrium, the
central bank will deliberately introduce uncertainty about the timing and size of
the devaluation. By making it difficult for speculators to predict the conditions
under which it will change the exchange rate policy, the central bank can hope
to avoid a speculative attack.
This incentive to introduce uncertainty into degree and timing of devalua-
tions has not been previously analyzed. It implies that exchange rate uncertainty
is in fact an important feature of fixed exchange rate regimes. Exchange rate
uncertainty will be introduced endogenously, and deliberately by the monetary
authorities in an attempt to avoid speculative attacks. Note, however, that one of
the main arguments in favor of fixed exchange rates is that they may decrease the
exchange rate uncertainty inherent in a floating exchange rate system. The results
of this paper suggest that, in practice, the incentives of the monetary authorities
may lead them to deliberately reintroduce much of this uncertainty in an attempt
to avoid speculative attacks.
In this paper strategic interaction between many small foreign currency spec-
ulators and the central bank is analyzed as a Markov Perfect Nash equilibrium
in an infinitely repeated game. This permits an investigation of optimal deval-
uation policy in the typical case of countries without perfect capital controls.4
The model has a parameter which captures some types of capital controls, and
it is shown that with strong enough capital controls the equilibrium collapses to
a deterministic (S, s) rule for the central bank, as in Flood and Marion’s (1997)
work with perfect capital controls. However, with less onerous capital controls
the equilibrium will be qualitatively different as the central bank actively tries to
avoid speculative attacks.
Technically, the approach taken here is in the spirit of Bénabou (1989) who
analyzes the pricing behavior of a monopolist in an inflationary environment
facing consumers with unit demands, some of whom are able to store the good
for one period. Conceptually, the extension of the durable goods monopolist’s
problem to the problem of a central bank facing speculators is quite clean (as
Bénabou notes). However, there are technical complications. The assumption of
unit demands allows B́enabou to pin down the upper price in his modified (S, s)
rule which is crucial in his proofs. One technical innovation of this paper is
to derive the modified (S, s) rule in a framework that is not restricted by unit
demands. The speculators’ demand for foreign currency is typically an increas-
ing function of the perceived probability of a devaluation, as well as expected
size of the devaluation. This generalization opens the opportunity for Bénabou’s
4 This type of strategic interaction has been receiving increased attention in the literature on spec-
ulative attacks leading to abandonments of fixed exchange rate regimes. Examples include Andersen
(1994), Cole and Kehoe (1996a,b), Davies and Vines (1995), Morris and Shin (1998), Obstfeld (1994,
1996), Ozkan and Sutherland (1994, 1995, 1998), Pastine (1998), and Velasco (1997). These papers
find that many of the results of the earlier literature that did not incorporate strategic interaction are
changed, either qualitatively or quantitatively, by strategic interaction between the central bank and
speculators.
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approach to be applied to many more markets with adjustment costs, most of
which have no analog of unit demands.
The next section provides a characterization of the game between many small
speculators and the central bank. Section three then converts this specification into
an equivalent game which is amenable to analysis, and derives the equilibrium.
The intuition and implications of these results are presented in Section 4. Readers
who are interested in getting an overview of the paper and its results without the
mechanics of the proofs can read the framework in Section 2, the intuition in
Section 4, and the implications in Section 5.
2 Framework
A central bank, with initial foreign currency reserves normalized to one, offers
to buy and sell foreign currency at a nominal exchange rate s (domestic currency
price of foreign currency). The infinitely lived central bank maximizes, in each
period, the expected present value of its payoff function which is decreasing
in the degree of exchange rate “misalignment”: the difference between s and a
target exchange rates∗.
This target exchange rate depreciates at the rateπ ∈ (0,∞), the inflation
differential between the country and its trading partners. Therefore, if it does
not devalue the central bank will have a constant nominal exchange rate and
an increasing target nominal exchange rate. In order to achieve stationarity of
the infinitely repeated game it is convenient to write this relationship as an
appreciating real exchange rateq and a constant target real exchange rate,q∗.
The costs of misalignment are standard. A high real exchange rate results in
costly imports for consumers and higher production costs due to the increased
cost of imported inputs. A low real exchange rate results in decreased exports,
reducing employment in the tradable goods sector. The target real exchange rate
q∗ represents the policy maker’s subjective balance between these costs, possibly
due to the relative political power of the various interest groups in society. All
players discount the future at rateδ ∈ (0,1) and the central bank must pay a
menu costβ > 0 each time it alters the nominal exchange rate.β represents
unmodeled political and economic costs associated with a devaluation.
Each period a unit continuum of infinitely lived risk neutral speculators max-
imize the expected present value of their individual utilities. Each speculator has
domestic currency balances ofm ∈ [s,∞) available for speculative purchases of
foreign currency.5 If wealth is held in foreign currency the speculator must pay a
holding cost ofα > 0. One useful interpretation ofα is as a crude representation
of capital controls. This interpretation will allow a direct comparison between
5 m ≥ s guarantees that full speculation will completely deplete the central bank’s foreign currency
reserves. For simplicity,m is taken as state independent. This assumption is innocuous as long as
m ≥ s for all possible states.
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the results of this paper and the previous literature which assumes perfect capital
controls (arbitrarily highα).6
At the beginning of every period the central bank observes the real exchange
rate and level of foreign currency reserves and decides whether to alter the
nominal exchange rate or to let the real exchange rate be eroded by inflation.
Then, if it alters the nominal exchange rate, the central bank decides what new
rate to set. At the end of each period the speculators observe the real exchange rate
and the central bank’s foreign currency reserves and choose a level of speculative
foreign currency balances to carry into the next period.
Attention will be restricted to Markov perfect equilibria7 where strategies for
all players depend only on payoff relevant state variables. Concentrating solely on
state-space strategies reduces the number of equilibria from the potentially large
set which arise when history dependent strategies are permitted. The resulting
Markov perfect equilibria are still subgame perfect and, in general, more robust
to renegotiation and to finite versus infinite specification of the game. Since the
examination of purely state-space strategies does not permit the players to in-
fluence each other through reputation effects or to punish each other for past
“misbehavior,” the resulting equilibria can be thought of as the baseline equi-
libria from which the players may try to use reputations to deviate in a broader
examination.
In period n let q(n) represent the real exchange rate andfi (n) and f (n) ≡∫ 1
0 fi (n)di represent foreign currency balances held by speculatori and all spec-
ulators respectively. All purchases are made with domestic currency so at the
end of periodn speculatori ’s payoff is:
Gi (n) = fi (n − 1)q(n) − fi (n)[q(n) + α] (1)
The first term represents the sale of foreign currency purchased in the previous
period. The second term is the cost of current speculative purchases of foreign
currency. Consider a devaluation which is expected in periodn; q(n) is expected
to be high relative toq(n−1). In periodn−1 speculatori would purchase foreign
currency and her periodn−1 payoff would be lower by [q(n−1)+α] for each unit
she purchased. However, in period n she would be able to sell it, gainingq(n)
in that period. If the difference between the expectedq(n) andq(n − 1) is great
enough she will find speculation attractive and will purchase foreign currency in
period n − 1. From Eq. 1 the only payoff-relevant state variable for the choice
of fi (n) is q(n). Particularly, holdings of foreign currency brought forward from
the previous periodfi (n −1) are not payoff-relevant for the speculation decision.
At the end of periodn the central bank’s payoff is:
GCB(n) = −γ|q(n) − q∗| + q(n) (f (n) − f (n − 1)) − β∆
(
q(n − 1)/θ, q(n)) (2)
6 In the absence of capital controlsα could be interpreted as a (small) liquidity cost of holding
foreign currency. Alternatively, it could be interpreted as the additional cost of monitoring foreign
investment.
7 Due to Gertner (1985) and Maskin and Tirole (1987, 1988a,b).
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where θ ≡ 1 + π and∆(x, y) ≡ 0 if x = y and 1 otherwise. The first term
represents the loss due to a deviation from the target exchange rate.8 The second
term is the gain or loss due to purchases or sale of foreign currency. This is
specified in much the same way as for the speculators so that speculators gains
will be central bank loses. Notice that foreign currency reserves are a cost to
the central bank. In the dynamic game they will prove useful in maintaining a
fixed exchange rate but they are not desired for their own sake.9 Sincef (n) has
not yet been chosen, the only payoff relevant state variables for the decision
betweenq(n) = q(n − 1)/θ or selecting a differentq(n), at costβ, aref (n − 1)
andq(n − 1). If the central bank alters, the only payoff relevant state variable
for the choice ofq is f (n − 1). Markov strategies in this game can therefore be
specified as follows.
For each Speculator: a mappingfi : q ∈ (0,∞) → fi ∈ [0,m/s], specifying
her speculative purchases of foreign currency.
For the central bank: two mappings. One,p: (q, f ) ∈ (0,∞) × [0,1] → p ∈
[0,1], specifying its probability of altering the nominal exchange rate. And a
second mapping,q: f ∈ [0,1] → q ∈ (0,∞), specifying the real exchange rate
after the nominal exchange rate is altered.
3 Characterization of the equilibrium
3.1 Dynamic optimization
Define WS(q, fi ) as speculatori ’s maximized expected present value of utility
at her decision node (whereq is the current period’s real exchange rate) and
VS(q, f , fi ) as her maximized expected present value of utility at the central
bank’s first decision node of the period (whereq is the previous period’s real
exchange rate). Assuming an equilibrium exists these can be written as:
VS(q, f , fi ) = p(q, f )WS(q(f ), fi ) + (1 − p(q, f ))WS(q/θ, fi ) (3)
WS(q, fi ) = fi q + max
f ′i ∈[0,m/s]
{−f ′i [q + α] + δVS(q, f (q), f ′i )} (4)
Defining p̃, (q) ≡ p(q, f (q)) and q̃(q) ≡ q(f (q))∀ q and observing that spec-
ulator i takes bothf (q) and p(q, f ) as given, at her decision nodes her value
function is the solution to the Bellman equation:
8 The additional assumption thatγ > β/q∗ is sufficient to ensure that the central bank will prefer
to devalue as some point rather than allow the real exchange rate to approach zero.
9 This is intended as a useful simplification capturing the aforementioned central bank incentive
to avoid devaluations during a speculative attack. In reality central banks have reasons to care
about foreign exchange stocks as well as flows. For example, assuming unsterilized currency sales,
low foreign exchange reserves imply that the domestic money supply is low (since reserves were
purchased with domestic currency) and therefore interest rates will be high. At the cost of additional
complexity this could be included in the model but it would not change the basic results as long as
the cost of low foreign exchange stocks is small enough that the central bank would prefer to wait
out a one period speculative attack in order to devalue in its wake rather than during it. Since the
costs of low foreign exchange stocks are proportional to the period length while the flow costs are
not this is always the case for short period lengths.
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WS(q, fi ) = max
f ′i ∈[0,m/s]
{fi q − f ′i [q + α] + δp̃(q)WS(q̃(q), f ′i )
+δ(1 − p̃(q))WS(q/θ, f ′i )} (5)
for all q and her strategyfi is an associated optimal control.
For the central bank defineWCB(q, f ) as the maximized expected present
value of utility at its p decision node whereq is the previous period’s real
exchange rate. Likewise, defineVCB(q, f ) as the central bank’s utility at the
speculators decision node, whereq is the current period real exchange rate.
WCB(q, f ) = max
p∈[0,1]
{p(VCB(q(f ), f ) − β) + (1 − p)VCB(q/θ, f )} (6)
and,
VCB(q, f ) = q(f (q) − f ) − γ|q − q∗| + δWCB(q, f (q)) (7)
Therefore, the central bank’s value function at itsp decision nodes is the
solution to the Bellman equation:





q(f )(f (q(f )) − f ) − γ|q(f ) − q∗| − β
+δWCB(q(f ), f (q(f )))
]
+ (1 − p) [(q/θ)(f (q/θ) − f ) (8)
−γ|(q/θ) − q∗| + δWCB(q/θ, f (q/θ))}
for all q and his strategyp is an associated optimal control. At the central bank’s
q decision nodes its value function is the solution to:
UCB(f ) = max
q∈(0,∞)
{VCB(q, f )} (9)
and his strategyq is an associated optimal control.
3.2 Normalizations and definition of states
In this problem there are two state variables, the central bank’s reserves (equal
to 1− f ) and the real exchange rateq. By a convenient normalization this can
be reduced to a new problem with only one state variable per Bellman equa-
tion who’s optimal controls coincide with the optimal controls for the original
problem. From (4) and (7),
WS(q, fi ) = WS(q,0) + fi q (10)
VCB(q, f ) = VCB(q,0) − fq (11)
Therefore define the normalized value functions,
W (q) ≡ WS(q,0) (12)
V (q) ≡ VCB(q,0) (13)
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for a representative speculator and the central bank respectively. Both value
functions are measured at a decision node of speculators where speculators have
zero holdings of foreign currency. From (5)W (q) satisfies,
W (q) = max
f ′i ∈[0,m/s]
{−f ′i [q + α] + δp̃(q)[W (q̃(q)) + f ′i q̃(q)]
+δ(1 − p̃(q))[W (q/θ) + f ′i q/θ]} (14)
and from (6) and (7)V (q) satisfies,
V (q) = max
p∈[0,1]
{
qf (q) − γ|q − q∗| + δp [V (q̃(q)) − β − f (q)q̃(q)]
+δ(1 − p) [V (q/θ) − f (q)q/θ]} (15)
(10) can be rewritten as,
W (q) = WS(q, fi ) − fi q (16)
Since fi is already fixed by the time the speculator is deciding onf ′i , (14) is
an equivalent way of specifying the speculator’s dynamic programming problem
and determining her optimal strategyfi . By substituting (11) into (6) and noting
that f (q) is a constant by the time the central bank is making its devaluation
decision, it is straightforward to verify that (15) is an equivalent way of specifying
the central bank’s dynamic programming problem and determining its optimal
strategyp.
q(f ) is now the optimal control of,
UCB(f ) = max
q∈(0,∞)





Assume, for now,q0 ∈ (0,∞) and for anyt ∈ R+ define statet as any pe-
riod when the real exchange rate isqt ≡ q0θ−t . Now define:Vt ≡ V (qt ),
Wt ≡ W (qt ), pt ≡ p(qt , f (qt )), fit ≡ fi (qt ), and ft ≡ f (qt ). For notational
convenience, defineq(ft ) ≡ q(ft ), V (ft ) ≡ V (q(ft )), W(ft ) ≡ W (q(ft )), F as
the set of functions mappingR+ into [0,1] and defineF−1 as the set of functions
mapping [0,1] into R.
The normalized Bellman equation for a representative speculator is, therefore,
Wt = max
fi ∈[0,m/s]
{−fi [qt + α] + δ[pt (W(ft ) + fi q(ft )) + (1−pt )(Wt+1 + fi qt+1)]} (19)
If the central bank alters the nominal exchange rate the speculator gainsW(ft )
plus the sale of foreign currency. If the central bank does not alter the nominal
exchange rate the speculator gainsWt+1 plus the sale of foreign currency. The




ft qt − γ|qt − q∗| + δ
[
p(V (ft ) − β − ft q(ft ))
+(1 − p)(Vt+1 − ft qt+1)
]}
(20)
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If the central bank alters the nominal exchange rate it pays the costβ and gains
the value of the game with the new real exchange rate but must buy back all
outstanding foreign currency balances at the new exchange rate. If it does not
alter the nominal exchange rate it gainsVt+1 and must buy back outstanding
foreign currency balances at the real exchange rateqt+1. This is not, in fact,
as odd as it at first appears. For analytical convenience speculators are thought
of as selling their stock of foreign currency each period and then immediately
choosing the level of foreign currency balances to purchase to bring forward to
the next period. These foreign currency purchases are included in the valuesV (ft )
andVt+1. So while the central bank is thought of as buying back all outstanding
foreign currency balances in the next state, this does not necessarily imply that
the speculators will choose to carry zero foreign currency balances.
Both (19) and (20) are discounted, monotonic functions so they satisfy Black-
well’s (1965) sufficient conditions for contraction mappings. Therefore for any
p ∈ F, and anyq ∈ F−1 (19) has a nonempty set of optimal controls which will
be denoted byR′′(p, q). Similarly, for anyf ∈ F, and anyq ∈ F−1, (20) has a
nonempty set of optimal controls which will be denoted byR(f , q). Denoting the
optimal controls for (17) asR′(p, f ) a Markov perfect equilibrium is a fixed point
of the correspondence onF×F−1×F: (p, q, f ) → R(f , q)×R′(p, f )×R′′(p, q).
3.3 Continuation value equilibrium
To solve the problem, treat the endogenous functionV (·) on the right hand side
of (20) as exogenous and denote itV ∈ F−1. By doing so the original game is
replaced by a new game which terminates as soon as the central bank alters the
nominal exchange rate, at which point it receivesV . It must then buy back all
outstanding foreign currency at the new exchange rate. A Markov continuation
value equilibrium is characterized as (p, q, f ,V ) ∈ F × F−1 × F × F−1, such
that (pV , qV , fV ) are optimal controls of (20), (17), and (19) respectively. The
continuation value equilibrium is an equilibrium of the original game if and only
if V = V (·). Therefore the original infinite-horizon game is replaced by a family
of finite horizon games, the solution to which reduces the fixed point problem in
functional spaceF × F−1 × F to a simpler fixed point problem inF−1.
Necessary and sufficient conditions for the maximization of (19) are:
if qt + α > δ[pt q(ft ) + (1−pt )qt+1] then fit = 0∀ i ⇒ ft = 0
if qt + α < δ[pt q(ft ) + (1−pt )qt+1] then fit = m/s∀ i ⇒ ft = 1 (21)
if qt + α = δ[pt q(ft ) + (1−pt )qt+1] then fit ∈ [0,m/s] ∀ i ⇒ ft ∈ [0,1]
Speculators compare the return on domestic currency with the return on foreign
currency with the expected exchange rate in the next period. In the case of
equality each is indifferent between holding domestic and foreign currency so
each may hold any proportion of her wealth in foreign currency. Necessary and
sufficient conditions for the maximization of (20) are:
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if ft (q(ft ) − qt+1) < V (ft ) − β − Vt+1 then pt = 1
if ft (q(ft ) − qt+1) > V (ft ) − β − Vt+1 then pt = 0 (22)
if ft (q(ft ) − qt+1) = V (ft ) − β − Vt+1 then pt ∈ [0,1]
The central bank compares the incremental cost of buying back outstanding
foreign currency at the adjusted exchange rate (the LHS) with the increment in
the normalized valuations from changing the exchange rate (the RHS). In the
case of equality the central bank is indifferent and may set any probability of
altering the nominal exchange rate.
Proposition 1. (i) In any Markov perfect equilibrium V(q0) < 0, moreover, Vt <
0∀ t ∈ R+. (ii) q (ft ) is nonincreasing in ft (iii) V (ft ) is nonincreasing in ft .
Proof. Appendix A.
3.4 Critical states for deterministic exchange rate adjustment
By examining the conditions under which deterministic exchange rate adjustment
is possible, two critical states which play an important role in the players equi-
librium strategies will emerge. Define deterministic exchange rate adjustment as
pt−1 = 0 andpt = 1 (p−1 ≡ 0). At statet speculators are indifferent between
holding wealth in foreign currency and holding it in domestic currency when,
qt + α = δq(ft )
q0/θ
t = δq(ft ) − α
Solving for t , define overx ∈ [0,1],
τ (x) ≡ ln[q0/(δq(x) − α)]
ln(θ)
∀ x whereδq(x) > α
τ (x) ≡ +∞ ∀ x whereδq(x) ≤ α
(23)
τ (0) > 0 and, sinceq(ft ) is nonincreasing inft , τ (x) is nondecreasing inx. If
t ≤ τ (0) speculation is not profitable, even in the face of a certain exchange
rate adjustment. Ift ≥ τ (1) then, if the central bank is pursuing a policy of
deterministic exchange rate adjustment, each speculators will try to hold all of
her wealth in foreign currency. Aggregate speculation will be limited to one by
central bank reserves. Ift = τ (x) with x ∈ (0,1) then deterministic exchange
rate adjustment will induce aggregate speculation ofx. If aggregate speculation
is less thanx then the central bank will choose an exchange rate greater than
q(x) so speculation will be strictly preferred by each speculator. Conversely, if
aggregate speculation is greater thanx, the central bank will choose an exchange
rate less thanq(x) so each speculator will prefer to hold all her wealth in the
domestic currency. In the face of an uncertain exchange rate adjustmentfτ (x) < x.
for x ∈ (0,1].
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Now consider the problem from the central bank’s perspective. Assume that
t > τ (1) and thatpt = 1 soft = 1. Therefore, if this state arrives the central bank
will lose
δq(1) − qt
which is increasing int , sinceqt = (q0/θt ). If this cost is too high the central
bank will try to avoid it by having a positive probability of devaluation in the
previous period,pt−1 > 0. This suggests that there exists a critical stateµ such
that deterministic exchange rate adjustment with full speculation is suboptimal
for the central bank fort > µ. The following proposition formalizes this intuitive
claim.
Proposition 2. There exists a functionτ (x) > 0 defined on x∈ [0,1] andµ > 0
such that in any continuation value equilibrium: (i)∀ t ≤ τ (0), ft = 0. (ii)
∀ x ∈ (0,1] if t = τ (x) then ft ≤ x and, if pt = 1, ft = x. (iii) ∀ t ≥ τ (1), if pt = 1,
ft = 1. (iv) ∀ t ≥ 1 if t > max(τ (1), µ) and pt = 1 then pt−1 > 0. (v) ∀ t such that






The critical results here are that there can be no deterministic exchange rate
adjustment in states whereqt ≥ q∗ or in statest > max[τ (1), µ].
The nature of the continuation value equilibrium, and therefore of the com-
plete game, can now be established. It will be shown that, in general, the equilib-
rium consists of three phases separated by critical statesT andT: pure strategies
in the phaset ∈ [0,T), mixed strategies during the phaset ∈ [T,T), and then
pure strategies in the phaset ∈ [T,∞).
3.5 The pure strategy phases
It is necessary to show that there existsT∗ and T such thatpt = 0 ∀ t <
min(T∗, τ (0) − 1) and pt = 1 ∀ t > T. To find T∗ consider a case where the
public never speculates,ft = 0 ∀ t ∈ R+. The opportunity cost of postponing
exchange rate adjustment one period is (1− δ)(V (0) − β). If qt+1 > q∗ the gain
from postponing is−γ[qt+1−q∗] which is increasing int so the central bank will
not devalue whenqt+1 > q∗. If qt+1 ≤ q∗ the gain from postponing devaluation
one period isγ[qt+1 − q∗], which is decreasing int . At qt = q∗ the gain from
postponing is greater than the opportunity cost. However, as inflation erodes
the real exchange rate the gain from postponing declines. The central bank will
devalue at the first state greater than or equal toT∗ defined by,
γ[qT∗+1 − q∗] = (1 − δ)(V (0) − β) (24)
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Now consider the other extreme where the public always speculates,ft =
1 ∀ t ∈ R+. The opportunity cost of postponing exchange rate adjustment one
period is then (1− δ)(V (1)−β− q(1)). If qt+1 > q∗ the gain from postponing is
still −γ[qt+1 − q∗] which is increasing int so the central bank will not devalue
when qt+1 > q∗. If qt+1 ≤ q∗ the gain from postponing devaluation one period
is γ[qt+1 − q∗], which is decreasing int . At qt = q∗ the gain from postponing is
greater than the opportunity cost. However, as inflation erodes the real exchange
rate the gain from postponing declines. The central bank will devalue at the first
state greater than or equal toT defined by,
γ[qT+1 − q∗] = (1 − δ)(V (1) − β − q(1)) (25)
By proposition 1, 0> V (0) ≥ V (1) soqT∗+1 > qT+1 andT + 1> T∗ + 1> 0.
The strategyq(1) = q∗ and thenpt = 1, q(ft ) = q∗ for all future states, is always
feasible which provides a lower boundV (1) ≥ q(1) + δ[V (1) − β − q(1)] or,
equivalently, (1− δ)[V (1) − β − q(1)] ≥ −β. Combined with (25) this yields
γ[qT+1 − q∗] ≥ −β. ThereforeqT+1 ≥ q∗ −β/γ > 0, which impliesT + 1< ∞.
These critical statesT andT∗ determine adjustment when speculators always try
to hold all their wealth in foreign currency and when they never hold any foreign
currency, respectively. They also provide bounds on the equilibrium adjustment
state, formalized as follows,
Proposition 3. In any continuation value equilibrium: (i) if t< min(T∗, τ (0)−1)
then pt = 0. (ii) if t > T or t = T ≤ τ (0) then pt = 1. (iii) if t = T > τ (1) then
ft = 1 and pt ≥ [qt − δqt+1 + α]/δ[(q(1) − qt+1)].
Proof. Appendix C.
The game begins with a phase of pure strategies,t < min(T∗, τ (0)−1), where
pt = ft = 0. In this phase the central bank does not alter the nominal exchange
rate and individuals do not hold foreign currency for speculative purposes. The
rest of proposition 3 states that the game ends with a phase of pure strategies,
t > max(T, τ (1)), wherept = ft = 1. In this phase individuals try to hold all their
wealth in foreign currency in anticipation of devaluation. However, in aggregate
they are unable to do so since their speculation totally depletes the central bank’s
foreign currency reserves. Although the central bank could set a low probability
of devaluation to deter this speculation, it has become too costly to wait, and it
devalues with certainty.
3.6 The mixed strategy phase
The probability of devaluation which leaves speculators indifferent betweenft ∈
[0,m/s] is given by,
qt + α = δ[pt q(ft ) + (1 − pt )qt+1]
Solving for pt ,
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pt =
qt − δqt+1 + α
δ[q(ft ) − qt+1] =
θ−t ((θ − δ)/δθ) + (α/δq(0))
θ−h(f ) − θ−(t+1) (26)
whereh(ft ) is defined by,
q(ft ) = q(0)/θ
h(f )
h(ft ) < t + 1 since otherwise speculators would strictly preferft = 0 ⇒ k(ft ) = 0.
Sincet > τ (1) impliesqt + α < δq(1) and (26) yieldspt < 1 ∀ t > τ (1) during
this phase.
The aggregate public holdings of foreign currency which leave the central
bank indifferent betweenpt ∈ [0,1] are given by,
ft =
V (ft ) − β − Vt+1
q(ft ) − qt+1 (27)
Sincept+1 = 1 is always possible, by (20),
Vt+1 ≥ ft+1qt+1 − γ|qt+1 − q∗| + δ[V (ft+1) − β − ft+1qt+1] (28)
which holds with equality ifpt+1 > 0. So, during the mixed strategy phaseft
follows the difference equation:
ft =
V (ft ) − δV (ft+1) − (1 − δ)β + γ|qt+1 − q∗|
q(ft ) − qt+1 +
[δq(ft+1) − qt+1]
q(ft ) − qt+1 · ft+1 (29)
Therefore, define,
zt,V (ψt ) =
θ−t ((θ − δ)/δθ) + (α/δq(0))
θ−h(ψ) − θ−(t+1) (30)
PV : (t , ψt ) ∈ R+ × R → Pt,V (ψt ) = min{1, zt (ψt )} (31)
and implicitly defineψt,V : (t , y) ∈ [τ (0) − 1,∞) × R → ψt,V (y) as:
ψt,V (y) =
V (ψt ) − δV (y) − (1 − δ)β + γ|qt+1 − q∗|
q(ψt ) − qt+1 +
[δq(y) − qt+1]
q(ψt ) − qt+1 · y (32)
During the phase of mixed strategies,pt = Pt , by (26) andft = ψt , by (29). Since
ft = 1 for t > max{T, τ (1)}, by propositions 2 and 3,ft can be constructed by
backward induction. Implicitly defineF : t ∈ [τ (0) − 1,∞) → Ft,V as,
Ft,V = 1 on [max(T, τ (1)),∞)
and, if T ≥ τ (1),
Ft,V = ψt,V (Ft+1,V ) = ψt,V ◦ · · · ◦ ψt+k,V (1) on [τ (0) − 1,T)
if T ∈ (τ (0) − 1, τ (1)),
Ft,V = ψt,V (Ft+1,V ) = ψt,V ◦ · · · ◦ ψt+k,V (xT ) on [τ (0) − 1,T)
Ft,V = xt on [T, τ (1))
(33)
wherek = min{j ∈ N |t + j + 1 ≥ T} andxt is defined onxt ∈ [0,1] by t = τ (xt ).
The subscriptsV will be omitted when no confusion will result. In the mixed
strategy phaseft = Ft . Proposition 4 describes the dynamics ofpt and ft during
the mixed strategy phase.
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Proposition 4. (i) ∀ V such thatT > τ (0) − 1, the function FV : t → Ft,V is
increasing on[τ (0) − 1,T]. (ii) The function PV : t → Pt,V is equal to one for
t ≤ τ (0), and then decreasing to its limit P∞,V = α/δq(1).
Proof. Appendix D.
The central bank’s desire to deter speculation implies that in the mixed strat-
egy phase the probability of a devaluation isdecreasing. Successful speculation
is becoming increasingly profitable during this phase, as the potential devaluation
becomes larger. Therefore, in order to continue to deter speculation the central
bank must convince speculators that success is less likely.
Since Ft ∈ (0,1) implies that the central bank is indifferent betweenpt ∈
[0,1] sopt = 0 is strictly preferred by the central bank whenFt < 0. Conversely,
pt = 1 is strictly preferred whenFt > 1. SinceFT = 1, the stateT at which the
central bank first has a positive probability of devaluation can be computed by
backward induction fromT and looking for the first (ast decreases) non-positive
value of the functionFt . DefineT(V ) by,
if T∗(V ) ≤ τ (0) − 1 then T(V ) = T∗(V )
if T∗(V ) > τ (0) − 1 then T(V ) = min{t ∈ [τ (0) − 1,T(V )]|Ft,V ≥ 0} (34)
Therefore,T > 0, pt = ft = 0 for states less thanT and,pt ∈ (0,1), ft ∈ (0,1)
for t ∈ (T, T).
Proposition 5. (i) T (V ) ≤ T∗(V ). (ii) if T ∗(V ) > τ (0) − 1,T(V ) < T∗(V ). (iii)
q0 < ∞.
Proof. Appendix E.
If T∗(V ) ≤ τ (0) − 1 the central bank will devalue before speculation be-
comes profitable and it will follow a deterministic (S, s) rule. However, if
T∗(V ) > τ (0) − 1, speculators will try to purchase foreign currency just be-
fore the devaluation and the central bank will try to randomize the timing of
the devaluation so as to devalue just before they do so. This causes the de-
valuation to occur, potentially, before it would in the absence of speculation
(T(V ) < T∗(V )). This implies that either there will be no speculation and the
central bank will devalue atT∗(V ) or there will be speculation and the central
bank will follow a mixed strategy during the phaset ∈ [T(V ),T(V )] but will be
precisely indifferent between this strategy and simply devaluing atT∗(V ).
The intuition for this result is instructive and quite general. While the spec-
ulators choose their foreign currency holdings simultaneously, it is helpful here
to think of them queuing at the foreign exchange desk. If there is a positive
probability of devaluation the first speculator will purchase foreign currency.
This purchase makes devaluation a little less attractive to the central bank. Spec-
ulators will continue to purchase foreign currency up to the point where the
central bank is indifferent between devaluing and maintaining the exchange rate
one more period. At this point if the next speculator purchased foreign currency
the central bank would strictly prefer not to devalue so the speculator will not
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make the purchase. Therefore, during the entire mixed strategy phase, which
includes the no speculation devaluation point, the central bank is indifferent be-
tween devaluing and waiting one more period. This implies that the central bank
is indifferent between the mixed strategy and a pure strategy of devaluing with
certainty at the point that it would if there were no speculation. It is important
to point out that this pure strategy is not part of a Nash equilibrium. The indif-
ference result is, however, an important implication of the actual mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium.
4 Intuition
The formal derivation of the equilibrium is given in the previous section. This
section aims to provide an intuitive understanding of the equilibrium. Depending
on parameter values the continuation value equilibrium, and therefore equilibrium
of the complete game, can take one of two basic forms.
4.1 Strong capital controls: deterministic outcome
With relatively low cost of devaluing the exchange rate,β, relatively high cost
of deviations from the target real exchange rate,γ, and high cost of holding
foreign currency,α, T < τ (0) so the central bank devalues often, but by a
small amount. The small devaluations and strong capital controls imply that in
equilibrium speculation is not profitable, even though its timing is known with
certainty. This implies that the central bank pursues a deterministic (S, s) rule
and that there is no speculation by individuals on the equilibrium path. Thus
with very onerous capital controls the equilibrium is observationally equivalent
to the equilibrium derived in work with perfect capital controls, Flood and Marion
(1997a).10
4.2 Capital mobility: mixed-strategy equilibrium with a stochastic outcome
With a relatively high cost of devaluing the exchange rate,β, relatively low
cost of deviations from the target real exchange rate,γ, and low cost of holding
foreign currency,α, a qualitatively different equilibrium emerges. The central
bank makes infrequent devaluations which are large relative to speculators’ cost
of holding foreign currency. Thus successful speculation will be profitable. The
central bank is well aware that if speculators know the date of the devaluation
they will engage in a speculative attack. To avoid such an attack the central bank
must introduce uncertainty into the decisions of speculators. Thus the equilibrium
will be in mixed strategies (shown in Fig. 1).
10 However off the equilibrium path the central bank may be playing a mixed strategy.
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Figure 1. Mixed strategy equilibrium, stochastic outcome. Central bank reserves, probability of
devaluation, and speculators’ desired holdings of foreign currency in equilibrium of the continuation
game. A devaluation ends the continuation game and a new game starts with a lowert (increased
real exchange rate)
The probability of devaluation and speculative foreign currency balances are
both zero fort < T. In each period thereafter,t ≥ T, there is a positive prob-
ability pt that a devaluation occurs, given that it has not occurred earlier. If the
devaluation has not occurred by stateT then it occurs with certainty. Speculators
hold increasing foreign currency balances in anticipation of devaluation. If the
game ever reaches a statet ≥ T, there is a run on central bank reserves and de-
sired speculative balances are greater than foreign currency reserves. Whenever
it occurs, the devaluation is to a real exchange rate which is a decreasing function
of the level of foreign currency held by the public. Therefore, the central bank
follows a modified (̂S, ŝ) rule, whereŜ and ŝ represent random variables.
During the phase of mixed strategies the probability of devaluation isde-
creasing. This surprising result is driven by the central bank’s need to deter
speculation. If the probability of devaluation were constant, a later state would
make speculation more attractive to an individual speculator. Not only is the
gain to successful speculation (δq(ft )−qt −α) increasing int (holding aggregate
speculation constant), but the cost of unsuccessful speculation (qt − δqt+1 +α) is
decreasing int . Therefore, to deter increased speculation, the central bank must
have a decreasing probability of devaluation. Since it will devalue with certainty
at t ≥ T, the expected time to the next devaluation may be either increasing or
decreasing int , but the probability of devaluation at state t must be decreasing.
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This result depends, in part, on the simple specification of the opportunity
cost of holding foreign currency, which is assumed to be constant,α. In a fully
specified monetary model the opportunity cost would itself depend on the aggre-
gate level of speculation through the interest rate. Thus in such a model deterring
speculation would be somewhat less difficult and so the probability of devalua-
tion would not have to decline as quickly. If the interest rate was very responsive
to the level of speculation, as it would be if central bank reserves were large rela-
tive to the money supply, then the probability of devaluation could be increasing.
What is interesting here is that when we endogenize the central bank’s behavior
in response to speculation, it is no longer obvious that the probability of devalu-
ation is monotonic in its target variable (in this case the real exchange rate). The
central bank will try to discourage speculation, and this creates an incentive to
lower the probability of devaluation as the expected size of the devaluation gets
larger.
The incentive to deter speculation is not analyzed in the existing literature
which takes either central bank behavior or speculator behavior as exogenous.
This literature predicts that the central bank’s probability of devaluation will be
strictly monotonic and increasing in its target variables. Thus nearly all empiri-
cal work which attempts to identify central bank target variables uses methods
which assume this ex ante. However, if central banks are actually trying to de-
ter speculation, these approaches may miss important determinants of central
bank behavior simply because they are based on models without strategic inter-
action between the central bank and foreign currency speculators. Whether this
simplification is warranted is an empirical matter which has not yet been fully
explored. The one empirical paper which I am aware of which does use a frame-
work which permits non-monotonic evolution of the probability of devaluation,
Klein and Marion (1997), does find some evidence suggesting that devaluation
probabilities may be decreasing in early dates.
Despite its best efforts to deter speculation, the central bank is only partially
successful. Speculators are aware that at some point the cental bank will devalue.
Thus private holdings of foreign currency are increasing over time, always keep-
ing the central bank indifferent between devaluing and waiting. If the aggregate
level of speculation were constant, both the cost of devaluation (ft [q(ft )−qt+1]+β)
and the benefit (V (ft ) − Vt+1) would be increasing int , but the benefit would
be increasing faster than the cost. Therefore, during the mixed strategy phase
speculative holdings of foreign currency are increasing (and central bank foreign
currency reserves are decreasing) untilt ≥ T. If a devaluation does not occur
before t ≥ T, then speculators will wish to hold all of their wealth in foreign
currency. Since foreign currency reserves are limited, this run on the bank totally
depletes its reserves.
The intuitive explanation for the discontinuous profile ofpt is best under-
stood by considering the outcome if there is never any speculation. In that case
the central bank would devalue with probability one atT∗ resulting in a unit
discontinuity inpt at T∗. In the presence of speculation it spreads out the proba-
bility mass on both sides ofT∗ with parts of the original discontinuity remaining
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Figure 2. Mixed strategy equilibrium, stochastic outcome. The nominal exchange rate – fixeds, target
s∗, and post-devaluations(ft ) – and the probability of devaluation in equilibrium of the continuation
game. A devaluation ends the continuation game and starts a new continuation game
at the extremities. On [T,T∗] the central bank attempts to take advantage of
the public’s low foreign currency holdings, while on [T∗,T] large speculative
balances make devaluation increasingly costly. However, atT it has become too
costly to wait, and the central bank devalues with certainty.
During the mixed strategy phase the post devaluation nominal exchange is
increasing at a rate less than the inflation differential,π, due to the increasing
private speculative holdings of foreign currency. Figure 2 provides a method
of examining the situation immediately after a devaluation. This is done by
realizing that a devaluation causess(ft ) to become the new nominal exchange
rate. The relationship between this exchange rate and the target exchange rates∗
determines the new state. Consider a devaluation which occurs atT. At the state
of the devaluation the distance betweens(ft ) ands∗ (labeled ‘a’) is equal to the
distance betweens and s∗ in the new post-devaluation state (labeled ‘b’). The
y-axis is then rescaled and the game continues from that state.
The graph is drawn so that the post devaluation state is greater thanT. This
is not necessarily the case but it is possible if reserves are large and the cost
of devaluation is small. In this case there is a positive probability of a devalu-
ation immediately after the first devaluation. The first devaluation is forced by
speculation and the large discrepancy betweens and s∗. After the devaluation
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speculators realize that the central bank no longer has such a strong desire to
devalue sinces is closer to the target exchange rate, so if they hold such large
foreign currency balances the central bank will choose not to devalue. Therefore
in equilibrium they sell some of their foreign currency, up to the point where
the central bank is indifferent between devaluing and maintaining the new ex-
change rate. Now that there is less foreign currency in the hands of speculators
devaluation is less costly, and the central bank may devalue again immediately.
Therefore the model implies that smaller devaluations just after a large devalu-
ation may be the result of optimal central bank policy rather than the result of
miscalculations in the original devaluation.
5 Conclusion and implications
This paper analyzes optimal devaluation policy in a fixed exchange rate regime.
If the political and economic costs of altering the nominal exchange rate are small
and speculators’ costs of holding foreign currency are very high, deterministic
devaluation policies may be optimal for the central bank. In this case, speculation
is not profitable even when the timing of devaluation is known with certainty.
However, if capital is mobile deterministic devaluation policies are sub-
optimal. In other words, there does not exist a Nash equilibrium where the central
bank adopts a pure strategy of devaluing at a certain date. If the central bank
was to follow such a deterministic policy, speculators would buy foreign cur-
rency in a sudden attack just before the devaluation. But in this case the central
bank would prefer to devalue just before the attack, leading to an even earlier
attack. Thus whenever the potential devaluation is large enough that successful
speculation is profitable, the equilibrium will exist only in mixed strategies.11
In the mixed strategy phase of the Markov Perfect equilibrium the difference
between the pre-devaluation nominal exchange rate and the post-devaluation
nominal exchange rate is increasing, so successful speculation is increasingly
profitable. However, during this period speculators are indifferent between at-
tacking and not since the probability of devaluation is decreasing. While the
central bank is trying to deter a speculative attack, speculators hold increasing
foreign currency balances. In fact, their foreign currency holdings are increasing
at an accelerating rate, but the expected profits from holding foreign currency
are zero. However, ex post, the profits from holding foreign currency during a
devaluation can be substantial. Eventually, however, if a devaluation has not yet
11 Karim Abadir and Harald Uhlig independently pointed out that the central bank’s problem
has much in common with the classic “Surprise Quiz” game. In that game a professor promises
the students that there will be a surprise quiz in the coming week. If the quiz does not occur by
Thursday, then the students know that it must occur on Friday, and thus it is not a surprise. So the
professor cannot play a pure strategy of having the exam on Friday. But if the exam has not occurred
by Wednesday the students know it must occur on Thursday, and it will not be a surprise. So the
professor cannot play a pure strategy of having the exam on Thursday. Backwards induction via the
same argument eliminates any pure-strategy for the professor. Similarly, the central bank would like
to have the devaluation of the fixed exchange rate come as a surprise to speculators, and so for the
same reason it cannot play a pure-strategy.
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arrived, the central bank’s reserves reach a critically low level, and the probabil-
ity of devaluation jumps to one. At this point speculation yields strictly positive
profits, even ex ante. So all speculators purchase as much foreign currency as
possible, fully depleting the central bank’s reserves and devaluation occurs with
certainty.
This possibility of non-monotonic devaluation probabilities arises here be-
cause the cental bank is explicitly trying to avoid speculation. The theoretical
literature has not permitted this possibility, and therefore very little empirical
work has been done to test whether devaluation probabilities are monotonic in
central banks’ target variables. However, the work that has been done by Klein
and Marion (1997) suggests that for some periods probabilities of devaluation
may be decreasing. Together with the results of this paper, these findings suggest
that central banks may in fact be actively trying to deter speculation.
Note that one of the arguments often cited in favor of the fixed exchange
rates is that they may decrease the exchange rate uncertainty inherent in a flexible
exchange rate system. This may potentially lead to welfare improvements through
increased trade volume and foreign direct investment. This model suggest that
in practice the incentives of the central bank may lead it to reintroduce much
of the exchange rate uncertainty in an attempt to avoid speculative attacks. This
suggests that the time near an devaluation of a fixed exchange rate is likely
to be characterized by a high degree of uncertainty. This uncertainty is not an
exogenous feature of fixed exchange rates but rather is introduced endogenously
and deliberately by the central bank in an attempt to devalue before a speculative
attack.
The seminal work of Harsanyi (1973) provides an additional interpretation of
this endogenous uncertainty. If speculators were unsure of the objective function
being used by the central bank, or about the current level of reserves, then the
central bank would follow a pure strategy. However, equilibrium uncertainty
would be present due to this exogenous uncertainty about the central bank’s
objective function. Harsanyi’s insight is that as this exogenous uncertainty goes
to zero, the equilibrium uncertainty does not. In fact, the probability of devaluing
the fixed exchange rate at each time approaches the probabilities found in the
model. This remarkable fact implies that even arbitrarily small uncertainty about
the central bank’s objective function or foreign currency reserves will lead to
very large uncertainty about the conditions under which the central bank will
devalue the fixed exchange rate regime.
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
(i) For V (q0) ≥ 0 or Vt ≥ 0 it is necessary that the central bank is making an
expected gain on foreign currency transactions⇒ ∃t ≥ 0 such thatft > 0 and:
qt ft − δ[pt ft q(ft ) + (1 − pt )ft qt+1] > 0 (A1)
From (21)ft > 0 implies,
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qt + α ≤ δ[pt q(ft ) + (1 − pt )qt+1]
qt ft − δ[pt ft q(ft ) + (1 − pt )ft qt+1] ≤ −αft
Which contradicts (A1), so all speculation is harmful to the central bank and (i)
is proven.
(ii) From (17) q(ft ) is the optimal control of,
UCB(ft ) = max
q∈(0,∞)
{V (q) − ft q}
so f ⇒ q and f ′ ⇒ q′. Assumef < f ′, revealed preference implies,
V (q) − fq ≥ V (q′) − fq′
f (q′ − q) ≥ V (q′) − V (q) (A2)
and,
V (q′) − f ′q′ ≥ V (q) − f ′q
V (q′) − V (q) ≥ f ′(q′ − q)
Combining this with (A2) gives,
f (q′ − q) ≥ f ′(q′ − q)
(f ′ − f )(q′ − q) ≤ 0
which implies thatq ≥ q′ proving (ii).
(iii) Assume V (q′) > V (q), then (A2) implies,f (q′ − q) > 0 ⇒ q′ > q, a
contradiction, which proves (iii).
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 2
(i), (ii) and (iii) shown in text.
The proof of (v) is a subset of the proof of (iv)∀ t ≥ τ (1) − 1, qt+1 ≤ qτ (1) so,
from the definition ofτ (1),
qt+1 ≤ δq(1) − α < δq(1)
Therefore,
∀ t ≥ τ (1) qt+1 < δq(1) (B1)
Now assume that (iv) does not hold,t ≥ 1, t > τ (1) andpt = 1. Since,pt−1 = 0,
(21) requiresft−1 = 0 and ft = 1 from (iii). There are two cases:qt < q∗ and
qt ≥ q∗.
Case I: qt < q∗. It is possible for the central bank to choosept+1 = 1 and
thenq(1) which puts a lower bound on its payoff in periodt + 1, from (20):
Vt+1 ≥ qt+1ft+1 + γ[qt+1 − q∗] + δ[V (1) − β] − δq(1)ft+1
V (1) − β − Vt+1 ≤ (1 − δ)(V (1) − β) − ft+1(qt+1 − δq(1)) − γ[qt+1 − q∗]
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Sincept = ft = 1 andq(ft ) is nonincreasing inft , (22) requires,
q(1) − qt+1 ≤ V (1) − β − Vt+1
Combining the two,
q(1) − qt+1 ≤ (1 − δ)(V (1) − β) − ft+1(qt+1 − δq(1)) − γ[qt+1 − q∗]
(1 − δ)(V (1) − β) ≥ q(1) − qt+1 + ft+1(qt+1 − δq(1)) +γ[qt+1 − q∗] (B2)
Sincept = ft = 1, (20) implies,
Vt = qt + γ[qt − q∗] + δ[V (1) − β] − δq(1) (B3)
pt−1 = ft−1 = 0 and (22) yield,
0 ≥ V (0) − β − Vt
By proposition 1,V (1) ≤ V (0) ⇒ Vt ≥ V (1) − β so (B3) gives,
V (1) − β ≤ qt + γ[qt − q∗] + δ[V (1) − β] − δq(1)
(1 − δ)(V (1) − β) ≤ qt − δq(1) +γ[qt − q∗]
Therefore (B2) implies,
q(1) − qt+1 + ft+1(qt+1 − δq(1)) +γ[qt+1 − q∗] ≤ qt − δq(1) +γ[qt − q∗]
Rearranging terms,
γqt+1 − (1 +γ)qt + q(1) ≤ (1 − ft+1)(qt+1 − δq(1))
The R.H.S.≤ 0 by (B1) so,
γ(q0/θ
t+1) − (1 +γ)(q0/θt ) ≤ −q(1)
Solving for t ,




Therefore ifqt < q∗, this condition is required for the combinationpt−1 = 0 and
pt = 1.
Case II: qt ≥ q∗. The proof proceeds similarly to case I. It is possible for
the central bank to choosept+1 = 1 and thenq(1) which puts a lower bound on
its payoff in periodt + 1, from (20):
Vt+1 ≥ qt+1ft+1 − γ[qt − q∗] + δ[V (1) − β] − δq(1)ft+1
V (1) − β − Vt+1 ≤ (1 − δ)(V (1) − β) − ft+1(qt+1 − δq(1)) +γ[qt − q∗]
Sincept = ft = 1 andq(ft ) is nonincreasing inft , (22) requires,
q(1) − qt+1 ≤ V (1) − β − Vt+1
Combining the two,
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q(1) − qt+1 ≤ (1 − δ)(V (1) − β) − ft+1(qt+1 − δq(1)) +γ[qt − q∗]
(1 − δ)(V (1) − β) ≥ q(1) − qt+1 + ft+1(qt+1 − δq(1)) − γ[qt − q∗] (B4)
Sincept = ft = 1, (20) implies,
Vt = qt − γ[qt − q∗] + δ[V (1) − β] − δq(1) (B5)
pt−1 = ft−1 = 0 and (22) yield,
0 ≥ V (0) − β − Vt
By proposition 1,V (1) ≤ V (0) ⇒ Vt ≥ V (1) − β so (B5) gives,
V (1) − β ≤ qt − γ[qt − q∗] + δ[V (1) − β] − δq(1)
(1 − δ)(V (1) − β) ≤ qt − γ[qt − q∗] − δq(1)
Therefore (B4) implies,
q(1) − qt+1 + ft+1(qt+1 − δq(1)) − γ[qt − q∗] ≤ qt − γ[qt − q∗] − δq(1)
Rearranging terms,
[qt − q(1)] − γ[qt − qt+1] ≥ (1 − ft+1)(δq(1) − qt+1)
The L.H.S. is negative and the R.H.S. is positive by (B1). This contradiction
implies thatpt−1 = 0 andpt = 1 is not possible fort such thatqt ≥ q∗, which
proves (v). In addition, together case I and case II prove (iv).
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 3
Define:σ(V ) ≡ (1 − δ)(V (0) − β) andϕ(V ) ≡ (1 − δ)(V (1) − β − q(1)). When
no confusion results the argumentV will be omitted.
(i) If qt+1 ≥ q∗ then ft = 0 ∀ t < τ (0) by proposition 1 and, therefore,pt = 0 as
previously shown. Ifqt+1 < q∗ then ft+1 = 0 sincet + 1< τ (0). Sincept+1 = 1 is
possible, (20) implies,
Vt+1 ≥ γ[qt+1 − q∗] + δ(V (0) − β)
so,
V (0) − β − Vt+1 ≤ (1 − δ)(V (0) − β) − γ[qt+1 − q∗]
V (0) − β − Vt+1 ≤ σ − γ[qt+1 − q∗] = qT∗+1 − γ[qt+1 − q∗]
SinceT∗ > t
V (0) − β − Vt+1 < 0
so (22) impliespt = 0 and (i) is proven.
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(ii) t ≥ T ⇒ qt < q∗.
By proposition 2, if ft+1 > 0 then t + 1 > τ (ft+1) and the definition ofτ (ft+1)
imply,
qt+1 + α < δq(ft+1)
So for all ft+1,
ft+1[qt+1 − δq(ft+1)] ≤ 0 (C1)
Claim 1: ∀ t ∈ R+, t > T ⇒ pt > 0.
Assume not:t > T andpt = 0. If pt+1 > 0 thenpt+1 = 1 yields the same expected
payoff:
Vt+1 = qt+1ft+1 + γ[qt+1 − q∗] + δ(V (ft+1) − β − ft+1q(ft+1))
Vt+1 = γ[qt+1 − q∗] + δ(V (ft+1) − β) + ft+1(qt+1 − δq(ft+1))
V (0) − β − Vt+1 = (1 − δ)(V (0) − β) − γ[qt+1 − q∗] − ft+1[qt+1 − δq(ft+1)]
and by (C1)
V (0) − β − Vt+1 ≥ (1 − δ)(V (0) − β) − γ[qt+1 − q∗]
Sincet ≥ T,
V (0) − β − Vt+1 ≥ σ − qt+1 > ϕ− qT+1 > 0
Sincept = 0 ⇒ ft = 0, (22) implies,
V (0) − β − Vt+1 ≤ 0
a contradiction, so ifpt+1 > 0 thenpt > 0. If pt+N > 0 for anyN < ∞, backward
induction using the above implies thatpt > 0.
If pt+N = 0 ∀ N ∈ N then, by (21),ft+N = 0 ∀ N ∈ N. Therefore,





δi γ[qt+i +1 − q∗]
Sinceqt+1+i < qt+1 ∀ i > 0, Vt+1 < γ[qt+1 − q∗]/(1 − δ). From the definition of
σ:
(1 − δ)(V (0) − β) = σ > ϕ = γ[q − T + 1 − q∗] ≥ γ[qt+1 − q∗]
so V (0) − β > γ[qt+1 − q∗]/(1 − δ) therefore,
Vt+1 < V (0) − β
V (0) − β − Vt+1 > 0
Sinceft = 0, (22) impliespt = 1, a contradiction and claim 1 is proven.
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Claim 2: ∀ t ∈ R+, t > T andpt ∈ (0,1) ⇒ pt+1 ∈ (0,1).
Assume not:t > T, pt ∈ (0,1) andpt+1 = 1. From (20),
Vt+1 = qt+1ft+1 + γ[qt+1 − q∗] + δ(V (ft+1) − β − ft+1q(ft+1))
If t ≤ τ (0) thenft = 0 andV (ft ) ≥ V (ft+1) so,
Vt+1 ≤ qt+1ft+1 + γ[qt+1 − q∗] + δ(V (0) − β − ft+1q(ft+1))
V (0) − β − Vt+1 ≥ (1 − δ)(V (0) − β) − ft+1(qt+1 − δq(ft+1)) − γ[qt+1 − q∗]
and, by (C1),
V (0) − β − Vt+1 ≥ σ − γ[qt+1 − q∗]
t > T ⇒ σ < γ[qt+1 − q∗] so,
V (0) − β − Vt+1 > 0
This is inconsistent withpt ∈ (0,1), by (22), so claim 2 holds fort ≤ τ (0).
If t > τ (0) then eithert ∈ (τ (0), τ (1)] or t > τ (1). In the first instance the
definition ofτ (·) ⇒ pt+1 = 1 leads toft+1 > 0 andft+1 > ft . In the second instance
pt+1 = 1 leads toft+1 = 1 and, therefore, toft+1 ≥ ft . In either caseft+1 ≥ ft and,
sincept ∈ (0,1), (22) yields,
V (ft ) − β − Vt+1 = ft (q(ft ) − qt+1)
V (ft ) − ft q(ft ) = β + Vt+1 − ft qt+1
and from the optimality ofq(ft ),
V (ft+1) − ft q(ft+1) ≤ β + Vt+1 − ft qt+1
V (ft+1) − β − Vt+1 ≤ ft (q(ft+1) − qt+1)
V (ft+1) − β − Vt+1 ≤ ft+1(q(ft+1) − qt+1) (C2)
Sincept+1 = 1, (20) gives,
Vt+1 = qt+1ft+1 + γ[qt+1 − q∗] + δ(V (ft+1) − β − ft+1q(ft+1))
V (ft+1) − β − Vt+1 = (1−δ)(V (ft+1) − β) − ft+1(qt+1−δq(ft+1)) − γ[qt+1 − q∗]
And (C2) implies,
ft+1(q(ft+1) − qt+1) ≥ (1 − δ)(V (ft+1) − β) − ft (qt+1 − δq(ft+1)) − γ[qt+1 − q∗]
and, from (C1),
ft+1(q(ft+1) − δq(ft+1)) ≥ (1 − δ)(V (ft+1) − β) − γ[qt+1 − q∗]
(q(ft+1) − δq(ft+1)) ≥ (1 − δ)(V (ft+1) − β − ft+1qt+1)
γ[qt+1 − q∗] ≥ (1 − δ)(V (ft+1) − β − q(ft+1)) ≥ ϕ = qT+1
Which contradictst > T so claim 2 is proven.
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From the above, to prove the first part of (ii) by contradiction it is only
necessary to show thatpt ∈ (0,1) is impossible fort > T. By iteration of
claim 2, pt ∈ (0,1) ⇒ pt+N ∈ (0,1). Either ∃ N ∈ N where ft+N < ft+N+1 or
ft+N ≥ fN+1 ∀ N ∈ N. Sinceft+N+1 ≥ 0 this second case implies that∃ N ∈ N
such that
ft+N − ft+N+1 < ε
for any ε, however small. Taking such anN , pt+N ∈ (0,1) implies,
V (ft+N ) − β − Vt+1+N = ft+N (q(ft+N ) − qt+1+N )
pt+1+N ∈ (0,1) implies thatpt+1+N = 1 yields the same expected payoff,
Vt+1+N = qt+1+N ft+1+N + γ[qt+1+N − q∗] + δ(V (ft+1+N )
−β − ft+1+N q(ft+1+N )) (C3)
Combining the two,
V (ft+N ) − β + ft+N (qt+1+N − q(ft+N )) = qt+1+N ft+1+N + γ[qt+1+N − q∗]
+δ(V (ft+1+N ) − β − ft+1+N q(ft+1+N ))[
V (ft+N ) − β
] − [V (ft+1+N ) − β] = ft+1+N [qt+1+N − δq(ft+1+N )]
−ft+N [qt+1+N − q(ft+N )] + γ[qt+1+N − q∗]
which can be rewritten as:
(1−δ)[V (ft+N ) −β− ft+N q(ft+N )] − γ[qt+1 − q∗] + δ[V (ft+N ) −β− ft+N q(ft+N )]
−δ[V (ft+1+N ) −β− ft+1+N q(ft+N + 1)] = qt+1+N [ft+1+N − ft+N ] ≈ 0
By the optimality ofq(ft+N ),
(1 − δ)[V (1) − β − q(1)] − γ[qt+1 − q∗]
+δ[V (ft+1+N ) − β − ft+N q(ft+1+N )] − δ[V (ft+1+N ) − β − ft+1+N q(ft+N + 1)] ≤ 0
which reduces to,
(1 − δ)[V (1) − β − q(1)] − γ[qt+1 − q∗] ≤ δq(ft+N + 1)[ft+1+N − ft+N ] ≈ 0
a contradiction sincet > T which implies that∃ N ∈ N s.t. ft+N < ft+N+1 ⇒
t + N + 1> τ (0) by proposition 2.
Considering such anN , (C3) yields,
[V (ft+1+N ) − ft+1+N q(ft+1+N )] − β − Vt+1+N =
(1 − δ)[V (ft+1+N ) − β − ft+1+N q(ft+1+N )] − γ[qt+1+N − q∗] − ft+1+N qt+1+N
From the optimality offt+1+N , V (ft+1+N ) − ft+1+N q(ft+1+N ) ≥ V (1) − q(1) and
ft+1+N > ft+N ,
Devaluation of fixed exchange rates 657
[V (ft+1) − ft+1q(ft+1)] − β − Vt+1+N ≥ (1 − δ)[V (1) − β − q(1)]
−γ[qt+1+N − q∗] − ft+1+N qt+1+N
V (ft+1) − β − Vt+1 ≥ (1 − δ)[V (1) − β − q(1)]
−γ[qt++N − q∗] + ft+N [q(ft+1+N ) − qt+1+N ]
sincet > T ⇒ ϕ > γ[qt+1+N − q∗],
V (ft+N ) − β − Vt+1+N > ft+N [q(ft+N ) − qt+1+N ]
So (22) guarantees thatpt+N = 1 so iteration of claim 2 implies thatpt /∈ (0,1)
and the first part of (ii) is proven.
For the second part of (ii), ift + 1 ≤ τ (0), thenft+1 = 0, from the definition
of τ (0), andpt = 1 from the definition ofT. If t + 1 ≥ τ (0) then, 0< t = T ≤
τ (0) ⇒ pt+1 = 1, from the first part of (ii), andft+1 > 0, so (20) yields,
Vt+1 = qt+1ft+1 + γ[qt+1 − q∗] + δ[V (ft+1) − β − ft+1q(ft+1)]
By V (0) ≥ V (ft+1) and sinceft+1 > 0 implies thatδq(ft+1) > qt+1,
Vt+1 < δ[V (0) − β] + γ[qt+1 − q∗]
V (0) − β − Vt+1 > δ[V (0) − β] − qt+1 = σ − qt+1 > ϕ− qt+1
Since t = T, ϕ = qt+1 so V (0) − β − Vt+1 > 0. By the definition ofτ (0),
t ≤ τ (0) ⇒ ft = 0 so (22) implies thatpt = 1, and (ii) is proven.
(iii) If pt = 1 thenft = 1 sincet > τ (1). t = T > τ (1) ⇒ pt+1 = 1, by (ii), and
ft+1 = 1, by the definition ofτ (1), therefore (20) implies,
Vt+1 = qt+1 + δ[V (1) − β − q(1)] + γ[qt+1 − q∗]
V (1) − β − Vt+1 = (1 − δ)[V (1) − β] − γ[qt+1 − q∗] − qt+1 + δq(1)
V (1) − β − Vt+1 = (1 − δ)[V (1) − β − q(1)] − γ[qt+1 − q∗] + q(1) − qt+1
Sincet = T ⇒ ϕ = qt+1,
V (1) − β − Vt+1 = [q(1) − qt+1]
So if ft = 1 the central bank is indifferent between any probability of devaluation.
However, if ft < 1,
V (1) − β − Vt+1 > ft [q(1) − qt+1]
[V (1) − ft q(1)] − β − Vt+1 > −ft qt+1
and by the optimality ofq(ft ),
[V (ft ) − ft q(ft )] − β − Vt+1 > −ft qt+1
V (ft ) − β − Vt+1 > ft [q(ft ) − qt+1]




qt + α ≤ δ[pt q(1) + (1− pt )qt+1]
Solving for pt ,
pt ≥ qt − δqt+1 + α
δ[q(1) − qt+1]
which completes the proof of (iii).
Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 4
(i) By (27) Ft satisfies,
Ft [q(Ft ) − qt+1] = V (Ft ) − β − Vt+1
and differentiation with respect toFt and t yields,
{
(q(Ft ) − qt+1) + Ft ∂q(Ft )
∂Ft












The L.H.S. is positive by proposition 1, as is the R.H.S. since,
∂Vt+1
∂t







(ii) By (21) Pt satisfies,
qt + α = δPt q(ft ) + δ(1 − Pt )qt+1




− δ(1 − Pt )∂qt+1
∂t





dt = {q(ft ) − qt+1} dPt
The R.H.S. is positive. The L.H.S. is negative by (i), proposition 1 and the fact
that,
[(∂qt/∂t) − (∂qt+1/∂t)] = [qt+1 − qt ]ln(θ) < 0
which proves the first part of (ii). Ast → ∞, qt andqt+1 → 0 so (26) and (33)
quickly yield the second part of (ii).
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Appendix E: Proof of Proposition 5
(i) and (ii) Evaluate (29) at ≥ T∗. qt+1 < q∗ andV (ft+1) ≤ V (ft ) so,
ft ≥ (1 − δ)(V (ft+1) − β) − γ[qt+1 − q
∗]
q(ft ) − qt+1 +
[δq(ft+1) − qt+1]
q(ft ) − qt+1 · ft+1
ft ≥ (1 − δ)(V (1) − β − q(1)) − γ[qt+1 − q
∗]
q(ft ) − qt+1 +
[δq(ft+1) − qt+1]
q(ft ) − qt+1 · ft+1
Since att ≥ T∗, ϕ ≥ γ[qt+1 − q∗],
ft ≥ [δq(ft+1) − qt+1]q(ft ) − qt+1 · ft+1
So, if t > τ (0) − 1 andt ≥ T∗ then ft+1 > 0 ⇒ ft > 0 which impliesT < T∗ if
T∗ > τ (0) − 1. If T∗ ≤ τ (0) − 1 then, by definition,T = T∗.
(iii) Define: q̂ ≡ max{qT ,q∗}, ∀ t such thatqt > q̂, ft = pt = 0. Therefore,
considering arbitrarily short time intervals,∀ q > q̂, the choice ofq is equivalent




δi [q∗ − q̂θk−i ] + δkZ
where,
Z ≡ q̂ f (q̂) + δ(V (q(f (q̂)) − β − f (q̂)q(f (q̂)) if f (q̂) > 0
Z ≡ δV (q̂/θ) if f (q̂) = 0
since f (q̂) > 0 ⇒ p > 0 and, atq = q̂, p = 1 is not possible by proposition 2





δi [q∗ − q̂θk−i ]
Y(k + 1) = δY(k) + [q∗ − q̂θk+1]
Therefore,
∂Y(k)/∂k ≈ Y(k + 1) − Y(k) = −(1 − δ)Y(k) + [q∗ − q̂θk+1]
so,
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∂V (k)/∂k ≈ −(1 − δ)Y(k) + [q∗ − q̂θk+1] + ln(δ)δkZ
∂V (k)/∂k ≈ −(1 − δ)q∗
k∑
i =0





∂V (k)/∂k . −(1 − δ)q∗
k∑
i =0




[∂V (k)/∂k] . −(1 − δ)q∗/(1 − δ)





[∂V (k)/∂k] . −∞
Which implies that in equilibriumq(0)< ∞ ⇒ q0 < ∞.
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